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Non-Legislative Rules Need Scrutiny Too:  
The Curious Case of the Appropriate Care Standard 
Ryan Mitchell* 
 
 
Introduction  
Executive agencies have earned the title of the fourth branch of 
government in part because of their quasi-legislative powers.1  When 
enacting a statute, Congress often includes a provision which prescribes the 
enforcing agency to create gap-filling rules.2  This rulemaking delegation 
creates the agency’s quasi-legislative powers.3  However, the agency’s 
quasi-legislative powers are not unbridled.  To prevent a chasm of 
federalism, either the agency’s enabling statute, the Administrative 
Procedure Act (“APA”), or both, require agencies to follow quasi-
democratic procedures when engaging in rulemaking.4  The most common 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2020, Vermont Law School; B.A., 2015, Franklin & Marshall College.  
Thank you very much to the HELJ editorial staff for your edits and suggestions.  I am 
grateful to James B. Witkin for inspiring this piece and your thoughtful mentorship.  Thank 
you Professor Hillary Hoffman for your expert guidance, feedback, and supervision.  And I 
owe a deep debt of gratitude to my family for their unconditional support, encouragement, 
and love. 
+ Editor’s Note: On July 29, 2019 the EPA issued Enforcement Discretion Guidance 
Regarding Statutory Criteria for Those who May Qualify as CERCLA Bona Fide 
Prospective Purchasers, Contiguous Property Owners, or Innocent Landowners (“Common 
Elements”) which superseded the Interim Guidance discussed in this article. This article was 
written and accepted for publication prior to this date. 
 
1. See generally Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation 
of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 615 (1984). 
2. See generally Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 
1051 (2015) (highlighting that “Congress routinely delegates to agencies the power to 
promulgate legislative rules”). 
3. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (“The legislative power 
of the United States is vested in the Congress, and the exercise of quasi-legislative authority 
by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in a grant of such power by the 
Congress . . .”). 
4. FUNK ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 126–137 (rev. 6th ed. 2019) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE]. 
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form of quasi-democratic rulemaking is notice and comment rulemaking.5  
Accordingly, agencies are generally precluded from adopting a legislative 
rule—a rule with a legal duty or legally binding effect—unless the rule has 
undergone notice and comment.6 
Generally, the next step agencies take after filling in the statutory gaps 
with legislative rules is to publish interpretive rules and guidance.7  
Sometimes, however, an agency will publish interpretive rules directly 
interpreting statutory language.8  Regardless, these non-legislative rules are 
not required to go through notice and comment.9  They are facially devoid 
of legally binding effect and exempt from rulemaking procedures under the 
APA.10  However, a closer look sometimes reveals that a legislative rule is 
disguised as a non-legislative rule.11  These disguised legislative rules 
undermine the agencies’ internal checks and balances, undermining the 
quasi-democratic impacts of notice and comment.  Therefore, it is of vast 
importance that suspicious non-legislative rules receive searching judicial 
scrutiny.  Such scrutiny exists in the form of the circuit majority-applied 
“legally binding effect” test and the lesser used “substantial impact” test.12 
Yet, a growing chorus of commentators are renouncing these tests and 
calling for a new test, the “notice and comment” test.13  This bright-line test 
asks whether the non-legislative rule has undergone notice and comment.14  
 
5. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard W. Murphy, Eight Things Americans Can’t Figure 
Out About Controlling Administrative Power, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 5, 13 (2009) (noting that 
notice and comment rulemaking is “the default mode in the federal government for making 
‘binding’ legislative rules with the ‘force of law.’”). 
6. Ronald M. Levin, Rulemaking and the Guidance Exemption, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 
263, 263 (2018). 
7. Id. at 270–71. 
8. See, e.g., EPA, INTERIM GUIDANCE REGARDING CRITERIA LANDOWNERS MUST 
MEET IN ORDER TO QUALIFY FOR BONA FIDE PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER, CONTIGUOUS 
PROPERTY OWNER, OR INNOCENT LANDOWNER LIMITATIONS ON CERCLA LIABILITY (Mar. 
6, 2003), https://perma.cc/4AHF-P44G [hereinafter COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE]; see, 
e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001) (evaluating a non-legislative 
rule directly interpreting a statute); see, e.g., Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 213 (2002) 
(evaluating a non-legislative rule directly interpreting a statute). 
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); see infra notes 22–
24 and accompanying text. 
10. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2012); see infra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996). 
12. William Funk, A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1321, 1326 
(2001) [hereinafter A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules]. 
13. William Funk, When is a “Rule” a Regulation? Marking a Clear Line Between 
Non-legislative Rules and Legislative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659, 663 (2002) [hereinafter 
When is a Rule a Regulation]; Robert A. Anthony, Three Settings in Which Non-legislative 
Rules Should Not Bind, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2001). 
14. When is a Rule a Regulation, supra note 13, at 663. 
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If so, then the rule has legal effect; if not, then the rule has no legal effect.15  
Scholars note that the test would greatly benefit the judicial process by 
economizing such judicial decisions.16  Resultingly, courts would cease 
their thorough and evaluative judicial scrutiny of non-legislative rules.17 
However, this approach likely benefits agencies more than it does the 
public and creates a slippery slope.  Scholars opposed to the “notice and 
comment test” consider the test a dangerous “short cut.”18  Further, they 
argue that agencies will no longer fear that their non-legislative rules will 
be overturned for failure to utilize notice and comment procedures.19  Thus, 
this approach affords agencies the latitude to broadly and aggressively 
interpret statutory and regulatory terms to include more responsibilities or 
stricter compliance requirements.20  While these non-legislative rules will 
be nonbinding, agencies only need a court to defer to such rules to gain the 
desired effect.21  Viewed in conjunction with the deference courts provide 
agencies, deleterious results could ensue.  Therefore, this approach has the 
potential to undermine the spirit of notice and comment rulemaking and 
would be a disservice to democracy. 
This Note attempts to promote the need for continued judicial scrutiny 
of non-legislative rules by examining the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA”) Common Elements Guidance to the Comprehensive 
Environmental Recovery (“Guidance”), and the Compensation, and 
Liability Act’s (“CERCLA”) Bona Fide Perspective Purchaser (“BFPP”) 
defense.  Part I examines the background on non-legislative rules.  Part II 
establishes the Guidance’s factual background.  Part III sets the framework 
for judicial review of the Guidance.  Part IV applies both the “legally 
binding effect” test and the “substantial impact” test to evaluate whether 
the guidance is a procedurally deficient non-legislative rule.  Finally, this 
Note concludes by analyzing whether or not a court is likely to find that the 
Guidance violates the APA, addressing how EPA or Congress can solve 
this problem, and arguing that courts need to continue scrutinizing non-
legislative rules. 
 
 
15. Id. 
16. When is a Rule a Regulation, supra note 13, at 663; Anthony, supra note 13, at 
1313. 
17. When is a Rule a Regulation, supra note 13, at 663. 
18. David L. Franklin, Legislative Rules, Nonlegislative Rules, and the Perils of the 
Short Cut, 120 YALE L.J. 276, 279 (2010). 
19. Id. at 280–81. 
20. Id. at 306–07. 
21. Id. at 323. 
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I. Background on Non-Legislative Rules  
For federal agencies, finding a balance between regulating in a fair, 
impartial, democratically consistent manner, while effectuating their 
regulatory duties efficiently and uniformly is an ongoing challenge.22  
Congress often tasks agencies with promulgating rules to fill statutory 
gaps.23  When promulgating legally binding regulations, agencies generally 
must comply with certain rulemaking procedures.24  Individual statutory 
provisions, executive orders, and the APA (and combinations of the three) 
can require rulemaking procedures.25  Such procedures help to ensure 
continued separation of powers by placing restrictions and oversight on 
how, and to what extent, the executive can create legislative rules––
Congress’s constitutional domain.26 
However, the same rulemaking procedures that ensure a balanced 
governance also stifle agencies’ abilities to promulgate necessary 
regulations.27  This ossified process has slowed rulemaking to a snail’s 
pace.  On average, the rulemaking process for major federal rules takes 
approximately four to eight years.28  Yet agencies have a marginal solution 
to ossification: non-legislative rules. 
Non-legislative rules are generally exempt from rulemaking 
procedures––but the APA poorly defines the category.29  This general 
exemption from rulemaking procedures is one of the reasons agencies 
often use non-legislative rules.30  The exemption gives agencies a level 
of flexibility and expediency, helping agencies avoid some 
ossification.31  Notably, the courts have narrowly construed the 
 
22. See Stuart Shapiro, Agency Oversight As “Whac-A-Mole”: The Challenge of 
Restricting Agency Use of Nonlegislative Rules, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 549 
(2014) (“Legislation inevitably gives agencies discretion to make policy choices. Over the 
past half-century, informal rulemaking has become the preeminent way that agencies make 
these choices.  As a result, there have been increasing attempts to proceduralize the informal 
rulemaking process so as to give it a greater sense of democratic accountability.”) 
23. Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations in 
Chevron’s Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2451 (2018). 
24. Franklin, supra note 18, at 278. 
25. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 126–37 
(providing examples of different types of rulemaking, which includes rulemaking 
procedures from individual statutes, executive orders, or the APA). 
26. Franklin, supra note 18, at 280. 
27. Id. at 283–84. 
28. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 140. 
29. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
30. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 341–43. 
31. Id. 
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exemptions so as to preserve the APA’s policy goal of public 
participation and government transparency.32 
There are several general purposes for non-legislative rules, besides 
combatting ossification.  Non-legislative rules inform the public about how 
an agency will interpret and enforce vague statutory and regulatory terms.33  
Similarly, non-legislative rules instruct agency staff on enforcement 
policies, providing agency-wide enforcement uniformity.34 
The APA provides several categories of non-legislative rules that are 
exempt from rulemaking: policy statements, interpretive rules, and other 
agency organizational rules.35  A policy statement generally informs the 
public and agency staff how the agency will proceed with enforcing a 
statute or regulation.36  An interpretive rule more thoroughly interprets 
statutory and regulatory terms, explaining how the law binds regulated 
entities.37  Yet, this definition does not diverge significantly from 
legislative rules, which also “advise the public.”38  But unlike legislative 
rules, interpretive rules should not establish duties separate from the law.39  
When an interpretive rule does have a legally binding effect, some consider 
it a “spurious” or “procedurally-deficient legislative rule,” which a court 
should vacate for improper rulemaking.40 
From the regulated entity perspective, non-legislative rules help 
entities comply with the law, thereby avoiding costly compliance or 
enforcement measures.41  However, regulated entities sometimes dislike 
non-legislative rules.  Without the APA’s notice and comment rulemaking 
 
32. See United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The APA 
does provide for exemptions from its notice and comment requirements.  But we note at the 
outset that the APA’s notice and comment exemptions must be narrowly construed.”); see 
also Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044–45 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“In light of the 
obvious importance of these policy goals of maximum participation and full information, 
we have consistently declined to allow the exceptions itemized in section 553 to swallow 
the APA’s well-intentioned directive.”). 
33. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 834 F.2d at 1044–45. 
34. Id. 
35. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
36. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 347–48. 
37. Id. at 352–54. 
38. Franklin, supra note 18, at 286. 
39. TOM C. CLARK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S MANUAL ON THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 29–30 n.3 (1947) (“Interpretive Rules – rules or 
statements issued by an agency to “advise the public of the agency’s construction of the 
statutes and rules which it administers.”). 
40. Robert A. Anthony, A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1045, 1048 (2000) [hereinafter A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules]; Jacob E. Gersen, 
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (2007). 
41. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 352. 
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requirement, agencies have leeway to burden parties with new legal 
interpretations, which often work by imposing fear of noncompliance.42  
These legal interpretations may not have the legal force of legislative rules, 
but agency staff may treat the non-legislative rules as such.43  Furthermore, 
regulated entities are not afforded an opportunity to comment during the 
construction of the rule, leading them to feel unheard and frustrated.44 
Because agency interpretive rules receive deference in judicial 
review,45 challengers have an uphill climb in court––regardless of 
whether they are challenging the agency’s first interpretation or its fifth 
in five years.46  Correspondingly, the lax requirements and nonbinding 
element of non-legislative rulemaking allows agencies to quickly shift 
their legal position, sometimes leaving parties, who rely on the non-
legislative rule, outside the boundary of compliance.47  This shifting of 
the bar of compliance/noncompliance––without notice and comment––
highlights one reason why agencies are oft-considered the fourth branch 
of government.48 
Accordingly, non-legislative rules suffer from their flaws.  While they 
are undoubtedly necessary for agencies when interpreting the words of a 
statute or regulation, or for providing policy information to staff and the 
public, non-legislative rules can quickly cross the line of legal effect.  
Agencies often teeter on that fine line because there is value in providing a 
rule, but not enough value in taking the rule through notice and comment.  
Resultingly, agencies sometimes produce non-legislative rules with 
 
42. Id. at 342–43. 
43. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 352 (highlighting 
that agency staff may inadvertently or strategically treat non-legislative rules as legally 
binding, thus leading the public to acquiesce to the non-legislative rule). 
44. See, e.g., Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d 206, 
208 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (highlighting that the Chamber of Commerce objected to a guidance 
document “on the grounds that prior notice and an opportunity to comment were required 
by the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the envisioned inspections will violate the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). 
45. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 352 
(highlighting that “reviewing courts give deference to agency’s characterization of its action 
as an interpretative rule.”); see also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993) 
(“[P]rovided an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations does not violate the 
Constitution or a federal statute, it must be given ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”). 
46. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 352. 
47. Id. at 342–43. 
48. See Gwendolyn McKee, Judicial Review of Agency Guidance Documents: 
Rethinking the Finality Doctrine, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 371, 376 (2008) (highlighting the 
separation of powers issue resulting from agency regulatory powers). 
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impermissible legislative characteristics.49  As we will see, the Common 
Elements Guidance teeters on the fine line of legal effect. 
 
II. Factual Background of the BFPP Defense and the 
Common Elements Guidance 
Across the United States, from the Industrial Revolution to the 1970s, 
private and public entities lackadaisically, and with limited oversight, 
disposed hazardous substances into the environment.50  In the 1970s, public 
recognition of extensive pollution hit a boiling point.51  Congress reacted 
by enacting a number of environmental laws.52  In 1980, Congress took a 
step to retroactively redress released hazardous substances and prevent 
future releases by enacting CERCLA.53 
On paper, CERCLA has produced fantastic results.  Polluters have 
paid enormous sums for their violations––deterring others from degrading 
the environment.54  The federal government and third-parties have 
undertaken extensive environmental remediations, restoring lands to a 
reasonable standard.55  These environmental remediations have helped 
many communities recover from the plight of hazardous substance 
contamination.56  However, the same mechanisms that led to CERCLA’s 
success have also prevented many parcels from being remediated. 
 
49. A Taxonomy of Federal Agency Rules, supra note 40, at 1048; Jacob E. Gersen, 
Legislative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705, 1711 (2007). 
50. See Spencer M. Wiegard, The Brownfields Act: Providing Relief for the Innocent 
or New Hurdles to Avoid CERCLA Liability?, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 
127, 132–36 (2003) (highlighting that oversight was generally limited to the judiciary, with 
challenges in the form of tort and property theories, such as negligence and nuisance, 
respectively). 
51. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Climate Change, Environmental Law, 
and Democracy, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1174–82 (2010). 
52. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970); Federal Waters 
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 2601 (1976); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1976). 
53. Comprehensive Environmental Recovery, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 9601 (1980). 
54. See John G. Aicher Jr., Developing CGL Coverage Defenses for CERCLA 
Remediation Costs: When Insureds Claim Coverage for Clean-Up Costs, a Vast Area of 
Discovery Is Opened, and Coverage Counsel Must Probe Carefully but Completely, 60 DEF. 
COUNS. J. 559, 559 (1993) (estimating in 1993 that the average site cleanup costs roughly 
“$30 million”). 
55. LeRoy C. Paddock, Green Governance: Building the Competencies Necessary 
for Effective Environmental Management, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10609, 
10626–27 (2008) (highlighting Brownfield remediation successes in Atlanta, Georgia; 
Clearwater, Florida; and Minneapolis, Minnesota). 
56. Id. 
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For example, CERCLA greatly restricted developers’ capacity to 
purchase, remediate, and utilize contaminated land––otherwise known as 
Brownfields.57  Before the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields 
Revitalization Act (“Brownfield Amendments”), if an owner had 
knowledge of hazardous-substance contamination on a property, prior to 
taking title, the owner could not raise any of the statutory defenses.58  Thus, 
a purchaser generally could not acquire a Brownfield without 
accompanying CERCLA liability because Brownfields are inherently 
contaminated.59  Fearing CERCLA liability, developers avoided 
Brownfields, leaving them contaminated and underdeveloped.60  As a 
result, the economic productivity of most Brownfields remained locked 
away.61  These underdeveloped lands generally have a depressing effect on 
the surrounding community.62  Furthermore, socially and ecologically 
valuable green spaces suffered as developers used these uncontaminated 
lands to avoid CERCLA liability.63 
Congress took the initiative to statutorily resolve the Brownfield 
issue by including the BFPP defense in the Brownfield Amendments.64  
The BFPP defense attempts to provide safe harbor to developers who 
are willing to voluntarily purchase and responsibly remediate a 
Brownfield.65  According to the amendment, developers, upon 
establishing that they took “appropriate care,” would be able to raise the 
 
57. Fenton D. Strickland, Brownfields Remediated? How the Bona Fide Prospective 
Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brownfield 
Redevelopment, 38 IND. L. REV. 789, 793–94 (2005).  
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)(i) (holding that a purchaser can assert the innocent 
landowner defense by demonstrating that they had no knowledge or no reason to know of a 
prior disposal). 
59. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-118, § 221, 115 Stat. 2370 (“[R]eal property, the expansion, redevelopment, or 
reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous 
substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”). 
60. ROBERT C. SMITH, BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESTORATION ACT OF 2001, S. REP. No 107–2, at 2 (2001). 
61. “[T]here are more than 450,000 brownfield sites nationwide that . . . pose health 
and environmental hazards, erode . . . cities’ tax base, and contribute to urban sprawl and 
loss of farmland.”  Id. at 1. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Signing of H.R. 2869, 
The Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act (Jan. 11, 2002) 
(transcript available at the Office of the Press Secretary). 
65. See PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 180 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (noting that Congress intended the BFPP defense “to promote voluntary 
brownfields redevelopment”). 
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BFPP defense.66  However, the BFPP defense appears to represent a shift 
in power from EPA to the regulated community.  EPA responded by 
promulgating a non-legislative rule that interpreted the “appropriate 
care” standard as much stricter than what a common-sense reading 
indicates––shifting power back to the agency.67 
 
A. The Basics of CERCLA Liability and the Need for a 
Specific Loosening of Liability  
As enacted in 1980, Congress intended CERCLA to respond to the 
detrimental toll pollution was having on human health and the 
environment.68  CERCLA’s main enforcement mechanism is expansive 
liability for costly environmental remediations.69  CERCLA generally 
holds a person strictly, jointly, and retroactively liable for remediation costs 
associated with the unauthorized release of hazardous substances into the 
environment.70  Generally, a person is liable under CERCLA if he or she 
meets six elements: (1) the property is a “facility”;71 (2) there has been a 
“release” or “threatened release” at the facility;72 (3) the substance released 
was a “hazardous substance”;73 (4) the release occurred into the 
 
66. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107–118, 115 Stat. 2360 (2002). 
67. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 9–12. 
68. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) 
(describing the purpose of CERCLA’s as to combat “the serious environmental and health 
risks posed by industrial pollution”). 
69. See Richard G. Opper, The Brownfield Manifesto, 37 URB. LAW. 163, 174 (2005) 
(Congress amended CERCLA “to allow bona fide prospective purchasers (BFPPs) a liability 
exception to encourage them to invest in a site for the purpose of its redevelopment.”). 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (2012); see also United States v. Coeur d’Alenes Co., 767 
F.3d 873, 875 (9th Cir. 2014); see generally Martha L. Judy, Coming Full CERCLA: Why 
Burlington Northern Is Not the Sword of Damocles for Joint and Several Liability, 44 NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 249, 291 (2010) (noting that only four out of 160 decisions have found 
divisibility to be judicially viable). 
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2012) (“The term ‘facility’ means (A) any building, 
structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including any pipe into a sewer or 
publicly owned treatment works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, 
storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or (B) any site or area where a 
hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come 
to be located.”). 
72. See id. § 9601(22) (“The term ‘release’ means any spilling, leaking, pumping, 
pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or 
disposing into the environment.”). 
73. See id. § 9601(14) (defining “hazardous substance” as the substances listed under 
§ 9602, and analogous provisions of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act, Clean Air Act, and Toxic Substances Control Act). 
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“environment”;74 (5) an entity has incurred response costs relating to the 
release or threatened release;75 and (6) the party liable for the response costs 
falls within the four classes of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”).76  
The four PRP classes are: (1) persons who currently own or operate a 
facility; (2) persons who at the time of disposal owned or operated the 
facility; (3) persons who arranged for disposal at a facility; and (4) persons 
who transported hazardous substances to a facility.77  These expansive PRP 
categories have contributed to CERCLA’s enormous effectiveness.   
CERCLA effectuates timely remediations by either authorizing EPA 
to initiate a cleanup78 or issue Unilateral Administrative Orders (“UAO”).79  
Under the former, EPA takes the lead on remediations, with the option to 
complete the remediation in collaboration with PRPs.80  After completing 
a remediation, PRPs are liable for all of EPA’s remediation costs.81  Under 
the latter, a UAO requires PRPs to undertake the remediation.82  The 
requirement results from the statutory limitation on challenging UAOs,83 
and the statutory consequences for UAO noncompliance.84 
EPA can fine a PRP $25,000 and seek treble damages for each day of 
UAO noncompliance.85  Thus, noncomplying PRPs can be liable for the 
 
74. See id. § 9601(8) (“The term ‘environment’ means [] the navigable waters, the 
waters of the contiguous zone, [] the ocean waters . . . and . . . any other surface water, 
ground water, drinking water supply, land surface or subsurface strata, or ambient air within 
the United States or under the jurisdiction of the United States.”). 
75. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(4)(A)–(B) (2012) (explaining that the clean-up costs 
recoverable must either be “consistent with” or “not inconsistent with” the national 
contingency plan (“NCP”), depending who is seeking cost recovery). 
76. Id. §§ 9607(a)(1)–(4). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. § 9604(a). 
79. Id. § 9606(a). 
80. Id. § 9604(a). 
81. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(A). 
82. See id. §§ 9606(b)(2)(A)–(B) (limiting PRPs from petitioning for reimbursement 
from the Superfund until after completing remediation); see also id. § 9613(h) (prohibiting 
courts from reviewing PRP challenges to Unilateral Administrative Orders). 
83. See id. §§ 9606(b)(2)(A)–(B) (limiting when a PRP can petition for 
reimbursement costs from the Fund until after completing remediation); see also id. § 
9613(h) (prohibiting courts from reviewing a PRP’s challenge to a Unilateral Administrative 
Order). 
84. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3) (defining the high financial penalties a 
PRP incurs for failing to comply with a Unilateral Administrative Order). 
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2012) (“Any person who . . . willfully violates, or 
fails or refuses to comply with, any [Unilateral Administrative Order] may . . . be fined not 
more than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply 
continues.”); see also id. § 9607(c)(3) (“If any [PRP] fails without sufficient cause to 
properly provide removal or remedial action upon [a Unilateral Administrative Order] such 
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total response cost multiplied by four, plus the $25,000 daily fine.86  Given 
that cleanup costs can run into the billions, a PRP must carefully consider 
whether its defenses are sufficient to counter the risk of incurring such 
penalties.87  However, the statutory limitations on challenging a UAO 
greatly constrain the defenses a PRP can raise and the PRP’s ability to 
employ its defenses.88 
Accordingly, § 9613(h) limits a PRP from challenging a UAO until 
the PRP has completed the cleanup.89  Correspondingly, this limitation 
moots a PRP’s ability to enjoin a UAO.90  Thus, PRPs are only left with the 
option to file an action for reimbursement from the government91 or 
contribution or cost recovery from fellow PRPs after completing 
remediation.92  However, § 9613(h) provides an exception for PRPs to 
challenge an action enforcing a UAO.93  As a result, a PRP must forego 
complying with a UAO, forcing EPA to bring an enforcement action.94  
 
person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages in an amount at least equal 
to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs incurred by the Fund as a result 
of such failure to take proper action.”). 
86. Treble damages are added to the original cost of recovery, resulting in a total cost 
of four time the original cost.  See United States v. Parsons, 936 F.2d 526, 529 (11th Cir. 
1991) (“We accordingly believe that the section should be interpreted to allow the 
government to recover up to a total of four times the amount it expended in cleaning up the 
hazardous wastes.”). 
87. See Eve L. Pouliot, Coercion vs. Cooperation: Suggestions for the Better 
Effectuation of CERCLA (Superfund), 47 SMU L. REV. 607, 622 (1994) (describing a PRPs 
decision to challenge a Unilateral Administrative Order as “large gamble” resulting from 
the exorbitant costs of remediation combined with treble damages). 
88. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(1) (2012) (“Any person who, without sufficient cause, 
willfully violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, any [UAO] may . . . be fined not more 
than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure to comply 
continues.”) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(3) (“If any [PRP] fails without 
sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action upon [a Unilateral 
Administrative Order] such person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages 
in an amount at least equal to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs 
incurred by the Fund as a result of such failure to take proper action.”) (emphasis added); 
see also id. § 9613(h) (prohibiting courts from reviewing a PRP’s challenge to a UAO, 
except under specific circumstances). 
89. See id. § 9613(h) (prohibiting courts from reviewing a PRP’s challenge to a 
Unilateral Administrative Order, except under specific circumstances). 
90. See Michael P. Healy, Judicial Review and CERCLA Response Actions: 
Interpretive Strategies in the Face of Plain Meaning, 17 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 53 (1993) 
(“Once the remedial action is completed, review would be wholly inadequate because the 
procedural claims would be moot.”). 
91. 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2) (2012). 
92. Id. § 9607(a)(4)(B). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(2) (2012). 
94. Id. 
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Hence, to file a pre-enforcement challenge against a UAO, it appears that a 
PRP must risk the heavy cost of UAO noncompliance. 
Following an enforcement action by EPA, a PRP can challenge a 
UAO on narrow grounds.95  Sections 9606(b)(1) and 9607(c)(3) require a 
PRP to show “sufficient cause” for its noncompliance to validly challenge 
a UAO.96  Satisfying the sufficient cause standard requires a PRP to 
establish an objectively good faith belief that the UAO is invalid or 
inapplicable.97  One such route to satisfying the sufficient cause standard is 
by raising one of CERCLA’s landowner liability defenses.98 
The original three landowner defenses were relatively narrow.  They 
included the “act of god,” an “act of war,” and “third-party” defenses.99  
Later, Congress adopted the Innocent Landowner defense (ILD), which 
protected owners who reasonably investigated the land and did not discover 
any contamination at the time of purchase, but existing contamination was 
later found.100  Yet, these defenses do not protect purchasers who are aware 
of contamination at the time of purchase.101  This created the current 
Brownfield dilemma, in which no developer wants to risk becoming a PRP 
by acquiring a Brownfield.102 
EPA responded to the dilemma by implementing the Prospective 
Purchaser Agreement (“PPA”) policy, as part of the Brownfields 
 
95. CERCLA holds that a PRP can only challenge a Unilateral Administrative Order 
if the PRP has sufficient cause.  Id. §§ 9606(b)(1), 9607(c)(3). 
96. See 42 U.S.C § 9606(b)(1) (“Any person who, without sufficient cause, willfully 
violates, or fails or refuses to comply with, any [Unilateral Administrative Order] may . . . 
be fined not more than $25,000 for each day in which such violation occurs or such failure 
to comply continues.”) (emphasis added); see also id. § 9607(c)(3) (“If any [PRP] fails 
without sufficient cause to properly provide removal or remedial action upon [a Unilateral 
Administrative Order] such person may be liable to the United States for punitive damages 
in an amount at least equal to, and not more than three times, the amount of any costs 
incurred by the Fund as a result of such failure to take proper action.”) (emphasis added). 
97. H.R. Rep. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 80 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2835, 2862; see also Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(supporting Congress’s reading that sufficient cause requires a showing of good faith). 
98. See Strickland, supra note 57, at 793 (describing to PRPs the “narrow scope of 
available defenses”).  
99. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (providing three defenses: an act of god, 
an act of war, and an act by a third party). 
100. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–499, 
§ 101(f), 100 Stat. 1613, 1616 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35) (2012)). 
101. See Nicholas J. Ortolano III, Note, Appropriate Care Under the Brownfield 
Amendments: A Better Standard After the Fourth Circuit’s Holding in PCS Nitrogen v. 
Ashley II, 5 SEATTLE J. ENVTL. L. 25, 35 (2015) (noting that a PRP cannot raise the ILD 
because he had knowledge of the contamination at the time of acquisition). 
102. William R. Weissman & J. Michael Sowinski, Jr., Revitalizing the Brownfields 
Revitalization and Environmental Restoration Act: Harmonizing the Liability Defense 
Language to Achieve Brownfield Restoration, 33 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 257, 257 (2015). 
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Initiative.103  The goal of the policy was to remove “the barriers imposed 
by potential CERCLA liability while ensuring protection of human health 
and the environment.”104  The PPA’s main mechanism was a covenant not 
to sue.105  Yet, while the PPA concept was appealing, the program did 
little to resolve the Brownfield dilemma––prior to the Brownfield 
Amendments, EPA only entered into 140 PPAs.106  Recognizing the 
dilemma, Congress took action. 
 
B. Congress Creates the BFPP Defense  
In 2002, Congress enacted the Brownfield Amendments, thereby 
creating the BFPP defense.107  The BFPP defense’s purpose is to 
encourage the redevelopment of Brownfields.108  The BFPP defense 
protects PRPs who, at the time of purchasing, had knowledge that the 
property was contaminated.109 
A PRP qualifies for the BFPP defense by satisfying various 
elements.  First, the PRP must purchase the property after January 11, 
2002.110  Second, the PRP must make all appropriate inquiries (“AAI”) of 
the property’s environmental status.111  Third, the PRP must provide EPA 
 
103. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REUSING LAND RESTORING HOPE: A REPORT TO 
STAKEHOLDERS FROM THE U.S. EPA BROWNFIELDS PROGRAM 5 (2003), https://perma.cc/ 
NY7S-EMYE (“EPA’s investment––nearly $700 million––in the Brownfields Program has 
leveraged $5.09 billion in Brownfields cleanup and redevelopment funding from the private 
and public sectors, and helped to create more than 24,920 new jobs for citizens in 
Brownfields communities.”). 
104. See Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements With 
Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser 
Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34792-01 (July 3, 1995) (highlighting the need to expand the PPA 
policy). 
105. Strickland, supra note 57, at 794. 
106. Memorandum from Barry Breen, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enf’t and 
Bruce Gelber, Chief, Envtl. Enf’t Section, Envtl. & Nat. Res. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to 
Superfund Senior Policy Managers (Regions I-X) et al. 2, 5–7 (Jan. 10, 2001), https://per 
ma.cc/7Z3Y-XY45. 
107. President George w. Bush, Remarks by the President in Signing of H.R. 2869, 
supra note 64. 
108. See Amy Pilat McMorrow, CERCLA Liability Redefined: An Analysis of the 
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its Impact on State 
Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1107–08 (2004) (“[T]he purpose 
of the [the BFPP defense] is to protect and encourage those with full knowledge of the 
contamination to purchase and redevelop the property.”). 
109. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107–118, 115 Stat. 2370 (2002). 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A)(i)(I) (2012). 
111. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(ii). 
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notice of the hazardous substances on the property.112  Fourth, the PRP 
must exercise appropriate care by taking reasonable steps to prevent 
continuing releases or future releases of hazardous substances, and 
prevent humans and the environment from exposure to the hazardous 
substances.113  Fifth, the PRP must cooperate with relevant agencies.114  
Sixth, the PRP must comply with agency-imposed land use restrictions 
and institutional controls.115  Seventh, the PRP must provide agencies 
with any information they request.116  Eighth, the PRP must not have 
sufficient contacts with or connections to third-party PRPs such that the 
purchaser has PRP status as a result.117  This note focuses on the fourth 
element: the appropriate care standard. 
The Brownfield Amendments clearly define the appropriate care 
standard.118  There are three elements to appropriate care.  A PRP must take 
reasonable steps to: (1) “stop any continuing release; (2) prevent any 
threatened future release; and (3) prevent or limit human, environmental, 
or natural resource exposure to any previously released hazardous 
substance.”119  The appropriate care standard represents a shift toward 
industry self-regulation. 
Prior to the BFPP defense, the due care standard governed the level 
of care a PRP was required to take when raising the Innocent Landowner 
defense (“ILD”).120  The due care standard is incredibly strict, yet fact 
specific.121  Thus, PRPs applying for the ILD have great uncertainty 
regarding remediation costs and liability risk.122  
Alternatively, Congress intended the “[appropriate care] standard . . . 
[to] be sufficiently flexible,”123 and to apply “generally accepted good 
commercial and customary practices.”124  Thus, the appropriate care 
standard would have helped employ the BFPP as a tool for well-intending 
 
112. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(iii). 
113. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(iv). 
114. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(v). 
115. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(B)(vi). 
116. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(vii). 
117. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(viii). 
118. Id. § 9601(40)(B)(iv). 
119. Id. 
120. Strickland, supra note 57, at 796. 
121. Idylwoods Assocs. v. Mader Capital, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 410, 417 (W.D.N.Y. 
1997) (“[T]he defendant must demonstrate that he took all precautions with respect to the 
particular waste that a similarly situated reasonable and prudent person would have taken in 
light of all relevant facts and circumstances.”). 
122. Strickland, supra note 57, at 801–02. 
123. H.R. REP. NO. 106-353, pt. 1, at 63 (1999). 
124. H.R. REP. NO. 106-775, pt. 1, at 81 (2000). 
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developers.  However, by promulgating the Common Elements Guidance, 
EPA steered the BFPP defense from being a useful tool to a shaky defense. 
 
C. EPA Promulgates the Common Elements Guidance 
The Common Elements Guidance does not interpret the appropriate 
care standard.  Instead, the Guidance jumps to what it terms the “reasonable 
steps requirement”––the three steps that define appropriate care.125  The 
Guidance equates the reasonable steps requirement to the due care 
standard.126  However, the Guidance does accurately recognize that the 
reasonable steps requirement language differs from the innocent landowner 
language––the origin of the due care language.127  Yet, the Guidance 
continues by stating that the due care standard is the best reference point 
for understanding the reasonable steps requirement.128  Moreover, the 
Guidance provides a questions-and-answers section that only provides 
answers by referencing the due care standard.129 
Thus, it appears that the Common Elements Guidance, by conflating 
the reasonable steps requirement and the due care standard, is vicariously 
stating that the appropriate care standard is roughly equivalent to the due 
care standard.  The due care standard itself is a very high standard.  
Therefore, EPA’s Common Elements Guidance is stating that the 
appropriate care standard is equally as high.  This elevation of appropriate 
care to due care is likely a legally binding effect which was required to 
undergo notice and comment. 
 
III. Judicial Review of the Common Elements Guidance 
Section 551 of the APA holds that a rule can take many forms––it can 
be “the whole or part of any agency statement.”130  Here, the Common 
Elements Guidance is a rule.  EPA published the Guidance, in whole, on its 
website.131  The Guidance is generally applicable to staff and regulated 
 
125. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 9. 
126. Id. 
127. 42 U.S.C § 9601(35) (2012); see also COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra 
note 8, at 9 (stating that the reasonable steps are “consonant with traditional common law 
principles and the existing CERCLA ‘due care’ requirement”). 
128. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8. 
129. Id. at Attachment B, 1–5. 
130. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
131. See Interim Guidance: Common Elements of the Landowner to Qualify for 
BFPP, CPO or ILO Superfund Liability Limitations, EPA (last visited Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/WG7A-CWZM (screenshot of EPA website from June 27, 2017). 
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entities interested in CERCLA’s landowner defenses.132  The Guidance also 
has a future effect on its subjects.133  Correspondingly, the Guidance 
implements EPA’s interpretation of the governing statute and 
regulations.134  These are general factors that indicate when an agency 
statement is a rule.135 
Another component for determining if a rule is valid is whether the 
agency had the authority to promulgate a rule for the specific subject 
matter.136  Congress delegates rulemaking authority to agencies by statutory 
mandates.137  Here, EPA has rulemaking power with respect to the 
landowner defenses because Congress delegated authority to EPA via the 
Brownfield Amendments.138  Thus, EPA has authority, through proper 
procedures, to adopt regulations that carry the force of law––or for creating 
non-legislative rules. 
The next inquiry is whether the Guidance is a legislative or non-
legislative rule.  Agencies can create legislative rules in two ways: with 
“formal” or “informal” rulemaking.139  Formal rulemaking requires 
lengthy, trial-like hearings.140  Formal rulemaking procedures are required 
if the governing statute requires the agency to make rules “on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing.”141  Informal rulemaking has three 
components: (1) notice to the public of “either the terms or substance of the 
proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved;”142 (2) 
providing the interested public “an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through the submission of written data, views, or arguments;”143 
and (3) “a concise general statement of [the agency’s] basis and purpose” 
for adopting the final rule.144  Notably, courts cannot impose more or less 
 
132. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 13. 
133. Id. at 2. 
134. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 9–12. 
135. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012). 
136. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302–03 (1979). 
137. Stephen M. Johnson, In Defense of the Short Cut, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 495, 499–
500 (2012). 
138. Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-118, § 223, 115 Stat. 236 (2002). 
139. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 126–37 
(explaining hybrid rulemaking). 
140. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012). 
141. United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 247 (1973). 
142. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3). 
143. Id. § 553(c). 
144. Id. 
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procedural rulemaking requirements.145  However, courts have made the 
notice and comment requirements more rigid.  For example, an agency’s 
final rule must be a “logical outgrowth” of its proposed rule.146  
Furthermore, a rule must have future effect and be of general 
applicability.147  Moreover, the statement must be “designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” 148  However, the Common Elements 
Guidance is neither a valid informal nor formal rule because it does not 
satisfy the APA procedural requirements.  At the same time, the Guidance 
is not simply a non-legislative rule because it creates new legal duties.  
Thus, the Guidance appears to be a procedurally deficient legislative rule. 
 
A. Standard of Review for the Common Elements 
Guidance 
Section 706 of the APA establishes the applicable standard of review 
for EPA actions.149  The Guidance shall be set aside if promulgated 
“without observance of procedure required by law.”150  Separately, EPA’s 
actions are invalid if they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in accordance with law.”151  If the Guidance is found to be 
a procedurally deficient legislative rule, a court may render the rule 
unlawful under the APA.152 
 
B. Scope of Review for the Common Elements Guidance 
A court will potentially prescribe Skidmore deference when reviewing 
the Common Elements Guidance.  For some time, the question as to 
whether courts granted Chevron deference to non-legislative rules was up 
for debate.153  Under Chevron, courts defer to agency statutory 
interpretations of ambiguous terms if the interpretations are “reasonable” 
 
145. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
524 (1978) (“[G]enerally . . . [§553] established the maximum procedural requirements 
which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting 
rulemaking procedures.”). 
146. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1079–82 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
147. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. § 706. 
150. Id. § 702(2)(D). 
151. Id. § 706(2)(A). 
152. Id. § 553. 
153. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1341–42. 
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or “permissible.”154  Yet, the general presumption was that Chevron only 
applied to legislative rules.155 
The Supreme Court ended the debate in Christensen v. Harris, 
holding that non-legislative rules were entitled to Skidmore deference.156  
Under Skidmore, courts view agency expertise as a guiding factor.157  The 
weight given to agency expertise will vary depending on the agency’s 
“thoroughness” and “validity of its reasoning.”158  A majority of courts have 
interpreted Skidmore deference as a “very weak form of deference.”159  This 
seems especially true for technical rules, such as the Common Elements 
Guidance, where notice and comment would best serve the hard look 
requirement.160  The hard look requirement holds that agencies need to 
provide thorough justifications when promulgating rules.161  When under 
review, a court considers whether an agency “entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem [or] offered an explanation for its decision 
that runs counter to the evidence before the agency.”162 
In United States v. Mead Corp., the Court confirmed that Chevron 
does not apply to non-legislative rules.163  Thus, under Mead and 
Christensen, it appears that the Common Elements Guidance will only 
receive the lesser Skidmore deference.  However, the Court pulled back in 
Barnhart v. Walton, holding that non-legislative rules are not automatically 
precluded from receiving Chevron deference.164  Furthermore, the Court 
conflated the Skidmore factors with the factors that determine the 
applicability of Chevron.165  The Barnhart holding has greatly challenged 
 
154. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
155. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1341 (“[T]he rational for 
the strong deference . . . [is] derived from an implicit delegation of legislative authority to 
the agency.”).  
156. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
157. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1994) (describing this level 
of deference as putting in the agency’s hands the “power to persuade”). 
158. Id.; but see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern 
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1259–60, 1275 (2007) (highlighting that in 
a five-year sample of federal courts of appeals cases that applied Skidmore deference, 
agencies prevailed in over 60% of cases). 
159. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 379. 
160. Franklin, supra note 18, at 322. 
161. Id. at 318. 
162. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 46–
51 (1983). 
163. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001). 
164. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 221 (2002). 
165. Id. at 222. 
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and confused the lower courts.166  While under a strict reading of Barnhart 
a court would likely prescribe Chevron, given the confusion it is also 
possible a court could apply Skidmore. 
 
C. Judicial Review for the Common Elements Guidance 
Section 704 of the APA stipulates that only final agency actions are 
judicially reviewable.167  Regulated entities often view guidance as final, 
particularly if the guidance’s substance curtails or compels the entity’s 
conduct.168  Agencies often view guidance as intermediary rules because 
they have yet to exhaust every regulatory option.169  In reality, guidance is 
final.170  Guidance documents have become “process-free vehicles for 
agency declarations of explicit standards and principles that have a real, 
direct, and potentially devastating impact.”171  Thankfully, courts have 
provided adequate tests to resolve the issue.172  However, a court must first 
find that the rule was a final agency action.173 
In Bennett v. Spear, the Supreme Court created the two-pronged 
finality test.174  The test asks: (1) whether the action represents the 
“consummation of the agency’s decision making process”; and (2) whether 
the action is “one by which ‘rights or obligations have been determined,’ 
or from which ‘legal consequences will flow.’”175  The Guidance 
potentially meets the consummation prong.  While EPA does title the 
Guidance as “Interim,” the Guidance will be the final interpretation until 
revisions are made.176  In National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council 
v. Shultz, the court reasoned that an interpretive letter written by an 
agency’s division Administrator was a final agency action, even though the 
 
166. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1447 (2005) (describing the confusion caused by the 
Barnhart decision). 
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 704 (“[F]inal agency action . . . [is] subject to judicial review.”). 
168. McKee, supra note 48, at 373–74. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 377. 
171. Id. 
172. See infra Section IV. 
173. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (“Agency action made reviewable by statute and final 
agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial 
review.”) (emphasis added). 
174. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 178 (1997). 
175. Id. at 177–78. 
176. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 1. 
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Administrator could change his interpretive position.177  The court also 
highlighted that the interpretive letter answered an important legal question 
and impacted a large swath of the interested industry.178  Similarly, the 
Common Elements Guidance was promulgated by the Director of the 
Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, and the Guidance has impacted 
the real estate development industry.179 
Furthermore, the Guidance states that comments may be submitted.180  
The Guidance’s request for comments resembles the APA’s § 553 comment 
requirement, but it does not project any indication to commenters that their 
comments will change the Guidance.181  Thus, if anything, the Guidance 
resembles not a draft rule, but a direct, final rulemaking.  However, as 
opposed to a direct final rule, the agency has no requirement to respond 
to comments. 
Most importantly, fifteen years on, EPA has not revised the 
Guidance.182  This significant period of time shows that EPA was providing 
its final conclusions when it released the Guidance.183  Therefore, a 
challenger can likely argue that the Guidance reflects the consummation of 
the agency’s decision-making process. 
The “rights and duties” or “legal consequences” prong is a different, 
more complicated story.  Bennett does not clearly define either of these 
categories, but a plain reading indicates that “legal consequences” is a 
lesser standard than “rights and duties.”184  While non-legislative rules 
generally do not determine rights or obligations, non-legislative rules 
sometimes create legal consequences. 
In Western Illinois Home Health Care, Inc. v. Herman, another case 
regarding an Administrator’s letter, the court found that the letter met the 
“legal consequences” standard.185  The letter provided the Administrator’s 
interpretation of the difference between willful and non-willful violators, 
 
177. Nat’l Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689, 701 
(D.C. Cir. 1971). 
178. Id. at 701–02. 
179. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 1; ROBERT C. SMITH, 
BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION ACT OF 2001, S. REP. 
No 107–2, at 1 (2001). 
180. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 14. 
181. See generally id. 
182. Id. 
183. McKee, supra note 48, at 384. 
184. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 177–78; Blake Emerson, The Claims of Official Reason: 
Administrative Guidance on Social Inclusion, 128 YALE L.J. 2122, 2164–65 (2019). 
185. W. Ill. Home Health Care, Inc. v. Herman, 150 F.3d 659, 663–64 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
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and how willful violators will be subject to fines.186  The letter went on to 
state that the recipients, under his interpretation, are willful violators.187  
The court found that the letter was not “tentative or interlocutory,” and 
imparts a “legal obligation” on the recipients.188  Thus, legal consequence 
flowed from the letter.189  Therefore, the letter was a “final and reviewable 
agency action.”190 
Here, a court could possibly find that the Common Elements 
Guidance creates legal consequences.  While the Guidance does not create 
specific legal consequences for failing to meet the Guidance’s required 
standard, failure to meet the standard will lead to general legal 
consequences, such as the inability to raise the BFPP defense.  In the 
alternative, meeting the second category––rights and duties––might be 
more appropriate.  This paper will evaluate whether the Guidance has an 
impermissible legal effect to determine whether the second prong is met.  
The likely result is that the Common Elements Guidance satisfies the 
finality test for judicial review. 
 
IV. Challenging the Common Elements Guidance’s Legal 
Effect: A Wolf-in-Sheeps-Clothing 
A plaintiff can potentially obtain judicial review of the Common 
Elements Guidance for EPA’s failure to engage in notice and comment 
because the Guidance has a legally binding effect.191  A non-legislative 
interpretive rule can be found invalid because it is in fact a legislative rule, 
and therefore required notice and comment procedures.192  Generally, an 
interpretive rule does not have a legally binding effect.193  However, it can 
gain a legal effect in three ways.  First, an interpretive rule gains a 
temporary legally binding effect if the agency utilizes the interpretation in 
an adjudication.194  Second, an interpretive rule gains a legally binding 
effect if the agency takes the interpretation through the appropriate 
 
186. Id. at 663. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. W. Ill. Home Health Care, Inc., 150 F.3d at 663. 
190. Id. 
191. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 4, at 354. 
192. Nat’l Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 
1967), aff’d, 393 U.S. 18 (1968). 
193. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(quoting Citizens to Save Spencer County v. U.S. EPA, 600 F.2d 844, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) 
(“An interpretative rule simply states what the administrative agency thinks the statute 
means, and only ‘‘reminds’ affected parties of existing duties.’”). 
194. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE, supra note 5, at 353. 
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rulemaking procedures.195  Third, a court can find that the interpretive rule 
has a legally binding effect if the agency, in promulgating the rule, created 
an entirely new duty.196  Here, EPA potentially created an entirely new duty 
when it expanded the appropriate care standard, via interpreting the 
reasonable steps requirement, as compared to the due care standard. 
Courts have developed several approaches to determine whether a 
rule is legislative or non-legislative.  These approaches, to varying degrees, 
examine the rule’s text, purpose, structure, legislative history, degree of 
enforcement, relationship to other laws, and more.197  One of the earlier 
tests courts applied was the substantial impact test.198  This test asked 
whether the non-legislative rule’s practical impact would have a substantial 
impact on affected entities.199  If the court found that the rule had a 
substantial impact, the court would require the agency to take the rule 
through notice and comment.200  However, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Vermont Yankee Candle Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense 
Council restricted courts from requiring further procedures for rulemaking, 
including non-legislative rules.201  Yet, the ruling did not scrap the 
substantial impact test.202  The test was altered to identify not whether the 
rule was a non-legislative rule that required notice and comment procedure, 
but whether the rule was an invalid legislative rule that the court could send 
back to the agency for failure to follow statutorily prescribed rulemaking 
procedures.203  While the substantial impact test still has its place in some 
courts, it is no longer the dominant test.204  However, there is still value in 
analyzing the Common Elements Guidance under the substantial impact 
test because of the muddled arena. 
The legally binding test is currently the dominant test.205  Put simply, 
the legally binding test asks whether an interpretive rule is legally binding 
 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Franklin, supra note 18, at 278. 
198. See Nat’l Motor Freight Traffic Ass’n, 268 F. Supp. 90 (applying for the first 
time the substantial impact test). 
199. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1325. 
200. Id. at 1326. 
201. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
553–54 (1978). 
202. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1326. 
203. Id. 
204. Id.  Recent cases have applied the substantial impact test, or at least highlighted 
its applicability.  See e.g., N.H. Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 887 F.3d 62, 70 (1st Cir. 2018); see 
also Defs. of Wildlife v. Tuggle, 607 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1114 (D. Ariz. 2009). 
205. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1326. 
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or creates legal duties.206  This reasoning is problematic because the test 
basically reiterates that “only legislative rules can be ‘legally binding.’”207  
Furthermore, agencies can always defend a challenged rule by simply 
specifying that the rule is nonbinding.  Thankfully, courts have identified 
other factors for determining whether an interpretive rule is legislative.208 
 
A. Applying the Substantial Impact Test 
The Common Elements Guidance likely fails the substantial impact 
test.  The test’s critical question is whether the non-legislative rule’s 
practical impact on interested entities is substantial.209  The factors used to 
assess the degree of the impact include: (1) how pervasive in scope the rule 
is; (2) whether the rule represents a change from existing law; (3) whether 
the rule is retroactive; and (4) whether there is “confusion and controversy 
engendered by practical difficulties of compliance with the new rules.”210  
These elements are not dispositive, but it has been suggested that meeting 
only one of them is sufficient to indicate that the non-legislative rule has a 
substantial impact.211  If there is a substantial effect, the rule is invalid for 
failure to undertake notice and comment procedures.212 
In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Ass’n v. Finch, the plaintiff sought 
to enjoin the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare and the 
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration from taking actions 
based on a non-legislative interpretive guidance document.213  The effects 
of the guidance would have been far reaching, affecting marketing designed 
for over 5,000 pharmaceutical products.214  The court held that the far-
reaching nature of the guidance document, affecting not only 
pharmaceutical manufacturers but also prescribing doctors and their 
patients, was sufficiently large in scope to satisfy the first element.215  
 
206. Id. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 1326–31. 
209. Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 
DUKE L.J. 381, 397 (1985). 
210. Cont’l Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Del. 1970); Manning Gilbert 
III Warren, The Notice Requirement in Administrative Rulemaking: An Analysis of 
Legislative and Interpretive Rules, 29 ADMIN. L. REV. 367, 390 (1977). 
211. Warren, supra note 211, at 390. 
212. Id. at 389–90. 
213. Pharm. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Finch, 307 F. Supp. 858, 859 (D. Del. 1970). 
214. Id. 
215. See id. at 864 (holding that the challenged non-legislative rules “are pervasive 
in their scope and have an immediate and substantial impact on the way [plaintiff’s] 
members subject to FDA regulation, conduct their everyday business.”). 
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Similarly, the Common Elements Guidance is pervasive in scope.  
The Guidance pertains to roughly 450,000 Brownfields nationwide.216  The 
Guidance also impacts almost every party involved: developers, 
environmental consultants, and community members.217  Thus, it is likely 
that a court will find that the Guidance has a pervasive scope. 
For the second element, asking whether the rule represents a change 
from existing law, we turn to Continental Oil Co. v. Burns.218  There, the 
court was tasked with determining whether the Federal Reserve Board’s 
non-legislative rule interpreting its own regulation for the Truth in Lending 
Act was invalid.219  Altogether, the court found that the rule was a valid, 
non-legislative rule.220  In terms of the second element, the court held that 
the interpretation “did not effect a drastic change in the existing law.”221  
The interpretation simply identified the existing exceptions to “late 
payment charges.”222  In no way did the interpretation include exceptions 
that were contrary or different from the regulation or the statute.223  The 
interpretive rule was simply clarifying a vague regulatory term. 
Here, Common Elements Guidance represents the opposite result.  
EPA directly interpreted statutory language with an interpretive rule.224  
The statutory language states that to obtain the BFPP defense a party must 
“exercise[] appropriate care . . . by taking reasonable steps to (I) stop any 
continuing releases; (II) prevent any threatened future release; and (III) 
prevent or limit . . . exposure.”225  The due care standard is also referenced 
in the statute, is recognized by courts,226 and standard sets a very high bar.227 
 
216. ROBERT C. SMITH, BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
RESTORATION ACT OF 2001, S. REP. No 107–2, at 1 (2001) (“[T]here are more than 450,000 
brownfield sites nationwide that . . . pose health and environmental hazards, erode . . . cities’ 
tax base, and contribute to urban sprawl and loss of farmland.”). 
217. Id. 
218. Cont’l Oil Co., 317 F. Supp. at 198. 
219. Id. at 195. 
220. Id. at 200. 
221. Id. at 198. 
222. Id. at 199. 
223. Id. at 198. 
224. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 9–12. 
225. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(B)(iv)(I)–(III) (1980). 
226. Id. §§ 9601(1), 9607(b)(3). 
227. From a statutory vantage, the due care standard requires a landowner to prevent 
all releases short of those caused by an act of god.  Id. § 9601(1).  CERCLA defines an act 
of god as “an unanticipated grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable, and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been 
prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight.”  Id.  Considering Congress’s 
intent to ease the restrictions on prospective purchasers, it is logically inconceivable that 
Congress plausibly expected prospective purchasers to remotely anticipate “unanticipated 
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Legislative history for the BFPP defense indicates that due care is a much 
higher standard than the appropriate care standard.228  Furthermore, the 
legislative history indicates that appropriate care is the BFPP provision’s 
operative term.229  Meanwhile, the Common Elements Guidance attempts 
to achieve two things.  First, the Guidance, by creating the “reasonable 
steps requirement,” holds that the operative term is not “appropriate care,” 
but is in fact “reasonable steps.”230  Second, the Guidance elevates the 
“reasonable steps requirement” to roughly the same level as due care, thus 
transitively elevating appropriate care to due care.231  This elevation of 
appropriate care to due care is a clear change from existing law.  Therefore, 
Common Elements Guidance likely satisfies the second element, which 
requires that the rule represents a change from existing law. 
For the third element––retroactivity––we turn to St. Francis 
Memorial Hospital v. Weinberger.232  There, the plaintiff charged the 
Secretary of Health, Education and Wellness with failing to take its 
Provider Reimbursement Manual through notice and comment 
procedures.233  While the court found in favor of the Secretary, the court 
elucidated that retroactive non-legislative rules are likely to have a 
substantive impact.234  The Common Elements Guidance is inherently 
retroactively because its overarching statutory liability scheme is 
retroactive.235  Thus, the Guidance meets the third element. 
 
grave natural disaster[s] or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable, and 
irresistible character.”  Id.  However, later amendments, legislative history, and case law 
clarified that in reality, the due care standard is less stringent than its plain meaning.  H.R. 
REP. NO. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 34 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6137; PCS 
Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161, 181 (4th Cir. 2013); New York 
v. Lashins Arcade Co., 91 F.3d 353, 361 (2d Cir. 1996). 
228. See H.R. REP NO. 106-353, pt. 1, at 63 (1999) (“[The appropriate care] standard 
should be sufficiently flexible based upon the nature of the contamination, the characteristics 
of the site, and the risks to human health and the environment that the contamination 
poses.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-775, pt. 1, at 81 (2000) (“[The appropriate care 
standard] requires . . . generally accepted good commercial and customary practices . . . .”). 
229. H.R. REP NO. 106-353, pt. 1, at 63; H.R. REP. NO. 106-775, pt. 1, at 81. 
230. COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 9. 
231. Id. 
232. See generally St. Francis Mem’l Hosp. v. Weinberger, 413 F. Supp. 323 (N.D. 
Cal 1976). 
233. Id. at 326. 
234. See id. at 328 (“[A court] should look to the impact on the parties subject to the 
regulation––are they subject to any new substantive duties or deprived of any preexisting 
substantive rights. [A court] may consider the impact of retroactive application; if such 
application appears inequitable the rule apparently has substantive impact.”). 
235. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2012) (holding PRPs liable for all past 
disposals). 
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Finally, for the fourth element we turn to Springs Mills, Inc. v. 
Consumer Protection Safety Commission.236  There, the Secretary of 
Commerce, under the Flammable Fabrics Act,237 promulgated a legislative 
rule without utilizing the notice and comment procedure.238  The rule 
prohibited the sale of and called for the repurchase of all children’s apparel 
that contained the fire retardant TRIS.239  The court found the confusion 
and controversy prong satisfied, as evidenced by the resulting litigation and 
the confusion between the parties as to how they got into such a mess.240 
Here, the Common Elements Guidance causes similar confusion and 
controversy.  Courts have heard many CERCLA cases that have included 
controversy over EPA’s interpretation of appropriate care.241  Moreover, 
numerous articles have noted that industry has struggled for years to truly 
understand the appropriate care standard.242  From a reasonable observer’s 
perspective, the appropriate care standard appears to be more flexible and 
achievable than due care.  However, the reasonable observer likely views 
the Common Elements Guidance as taking appropriate care in the 
opposite direction––even if the reasonable observer recognizes that the 
Guidance is not legally binding.  Accordingly, the Common Elements 
Guidance has produced significant confusion and controversy, thus 
satisfying the fourth element.243 
Altogether, the Common Elements Guidance passes the substantial 
impact test because it satisfies all four elements of the test.  Hence, a court–
–in the rare occasion it applies the test––would likely find that the Common 
Elements Guidance is a procedurally deficient legislative rule.  As a result, 
 
236. Springs Mills, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 434 F. Supp. 416 
(D.S.C. 1977). 
237. 15 U.S.C § 1191 (2012). 
238. Springs Mills, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 419. 
239. Id. at 418. 
240. Springs Mills, Inc., 434 F. Supp. at 430. 
241. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery LLC, No. 2:15-
cv-07786-SVW-JPR, 2016 WL 7665414  (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016), rev’d and remanded, 
888 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018); PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 
161 (4th Cir. 2013); Voggenthaler v. Maryland Square LLC, 724 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2013); 
3000 E. Imperial, LLC v. Robertshaw Controls Co., No. CV 08-3985 PA EX, 2010 WL 
5464296 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2010). 
242. Ortolano III, supra note 101, at 34–36; Jenny McClister, CERCLA’s Bona Fide 
Prospective Purchaser Defense: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 
13, 17 (2014); Strickland, supra note 57, at 795–803; William H. Dolan, Maintaining 
Innocence: All Appropriate Inquiry Under the Small Business Liability Relief and 
Brownfields Revitalization Act, 8 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 117 (2004). 
243. Of the four prongs that I present, I recognize that the fourth prong argument is 
the weakest. 
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the court will likely require the agency to take the Common Elements 
Guidance through notice and comment procedures. 
 
B. Applying the Legally Binding Effect Test 
While the Common Elements Guidance likely fails the substantial 
impact test, it is more difficult to say whether the Guidance fails the legally 
binding effect test.  The test has several factors, some of which are 
dispositive and some of which are not.244  The first four dispositive factors 
are: (1) “whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an adequate 
legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer 
benefits or ensure the performance of duties”;245 (2) “whether the agency 
has explicitly invoked its general legislative authority”;246 (3) “whether 
the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule”;247 and (4) whether the 
rule created a new legal duty or standard.248  The four persuasive factors 
are: (1) whether the agency declared its intent to publish a non-legislative 
rule by characterizing the rule as interpretive;249 (2) whether the agency 
published the rule in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”);250 (3) 
whether the agency previously adopted a similar rule after notice and 
comment;251 and (4) whether the consequences for violating the non-
legislative rule are significant.252 
 
244. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1326–31. 
245. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. 
Cir. 1993). 
246. Id. 
247. Id.; see also Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 171 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(“The Department’s position might seem further undermined by the fact that it has used the 
notice and comment procedure to promulgate rules prescribing perimeter fences for dogs 
and monkeys.”); and see United States v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 348 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“We do note, however, that the Park Service’s previous adoption of extensive and detailed 
site-specific regulations after notice and comment erects a high burden of persuasion.”). 
248. Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 167; Picciotto, 875 F.2d at 348 (“In contrast, we have found 
rules that grant rights and impose obligations to be substantive.”). 
249. Metropolitan School District v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“We would be less than candid 
if we pretended that the labels of ‘legislative’ and ‘non-binding’ rules neatly place particular 
agency actions within any particular category.  Instead, the categories have ‘fuzzy 
perimeters’ and establish ‘no general formula.’”); A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra 
note 12, at 1330. 
250. Am. Mining Cong., 995 F.2d at 1109. 
251. A Primer on Nonlegislative Rules, supra note 12, at 1331. 
252. Admittedly, this factor is not explicitly recognized by the court, but appears to 
be a general principle. 
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1. Dispositive factors 
Of the four dispositive factors, the Common Elements Guidance 
possibly satisfies the fourth factor because it prescribes new legal duties.   
Meanwhile, the first factor––whether without the rule the agency cannot 
adequately enforce statutory duties or rights––is not satisfied because EPA 
can enforce the BFPP defense without the Guidance.  Similarly, the second 
factor––whether the agency has explicitly invoked its general legislative 
authority––is not met because EPA does not explicitly invoke its 
rulemaking authority in the Guidance.  Finally, the third factor––whether 
the rule effectively amends a prior legislative rule––is not met because 
EPA did not promulgate a legislative rule regarding appropriate care prior 
to the Guidance. 
The Common Elements Guidance most likely satisfies the fourth 
factor.  In Hoctor v. United States Department of Agriculture, Hoctor ran a 
small, exotic animal sales business.253  Many of Hoctor’s animals were in 
the Big Cat family––ligers, tigers, lions, etc.254  The Animal Welfare Act 
(“Act”) governs the humane treatment of animals and authorizes the 
Department of Agriculture to promulgate rules consistent with the purpose 
of the act.255  Subsequently, the Department promulgated a legislative rule 
stating that a “facility . . . must be constructed of such material and of such 
strength as appropriate for the animals involved.”256  Next, the Department 
issued an interpretative rule of the regulation, addressed to staff, stating that 
dangerous animals, such as those in the Big Cat family, “must be inside a 
perimeter fence at least eight feet high.”257  Hoctor’s big cats were 
contained inside pens, surrounded by containment fences, all of which was 
within a six-foot perimeter fence.258  The Department cited and sanctioned 
Hoctor for not having an eight-foot perimeter fence.259  Hoctor then 
challenged the Department’s actions and sought judicial review of the 
interpretive rule.260 
The court held that the interpretive rule was a procedurally deficient 
legislative rule.261  The court recognized that the Act authorized the 
Department to establish containment standards for dangerous animals, such 
 
253. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1996) 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 167. 
256. Id. at 167–68. 
257. Id. at 168. 
258. Id. 
259. Id. at 168. 
260. Id. at 168. 
261. Id. at 172. 
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as requiring an eight-foot perimeter fence.262  However, such a standard 
would have to be created by procedural rulemaking because it is not simply 
an interpretation—it prescribed new duties.263  Congress delegated to the 
Department legislative authority precisely to prescribe new duties.264  Yet, 
the Department created the eight-foot standard without utilizing its 
legislative authority.265  Thus, the court found that the Department created 
a legislative rule without following the mandatory notice and comment 
procedure.266  Therefore, the court vacated the lower court’s ruling against 
Hoctor, and invalidated the rule.267 
Here, the Common Elements Guidance is not interpreting the 
appropriate care standard but rather articulating a new standard.  Similarly 
to Hoctor, a Brownfield developer controls the hazardous substances on the 
property, and therefore has the responsibility to deal with those 
substances.268  CERCLA governs how the developer controls the hazardous 
substance on their property, and EPA is authorized to promulgate rules to 
effectuate CERCLA’s goals.269  Specifically, CERCLA requires a 
Brownfield developer to “exercise[] appropriate care . . . by taking 
reasonable steps to (I) stop any continuing releases; (II) prevent any 
threatened future release; and (III) prevent or limit . . . exposure.”270  As 
noted above, the appropriate care standard is the operative term and is a 
lesser standard than due care.271  EPA has not promulgated any legislative 
rules regarding the appropriate care standard.  However, EPA issued an 
interpretative rule on the statute, addressed to staff, stating that the 
“reasonable steps” required are equivalent to the requirements of the due 
care standard.272 
As in Hoctor, this change from appropriate care to due care is a 
change in substantive law.  CERCLA clearly establishes the requirements 
 
262. Id. at 169. 
263. Id. at 169–70. 
264. See id. at 169 (“[W]hen a statute does not impose a duty on the persons subject 
to it but instead authorizes . . . an agency to impose a duty, the formulation of that duty 
becomes a legislative task entrusted to the agency.”). 
265. Id. 
266. See Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 169–70 (holding that the eight-foot standard is a rule not 
an interpretation because, while consistent with the act, it is not “derived from it . . . .”). 
267. Id. at 172. 
268. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2012). 
269. Id. § 9601(35)(B)(iii). 
270. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(B)(iv)(I)–(III). 
271. H.R. REP NO. 106-353, pt. 1, at 63 (1999); H.R. REP. NO. 106-775, pt. 1, at 81 
(2000). 
272. H.R. REP NO. 106-353, pt. 1, at 63; H.R. REP. NO. 106-775, pt. 1, at 81. 
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for appropriate care.273  Yet, EPA subverts the statutory language and the 
Brownfield Amendments’ purpose by reading the due care standard into 
the appropriate care’s reasonable steps.  Such a prescription of new duties 
requires notice and comment, which EPA neglected.  Thus, it is possible 
that the Common Elements Guidance satisfies the first dispositive factor––
whether without the rule the agency cannot adequately enforce statutory 
duties or rights.  Therefore, a court may find that the Guidance is a 
procedurally deficient legislative rule.  Moreover, even if EPA promulgated 
the Guidance after notice and comment, it is possible a court would find 
that the rule is arbitrary and capricious.  Under Chevron’s first step, the 
meaning of appropriate care is clear.  Even if the meaning were not clear, a 
court would still be hard pressed under the deferential second step to agree 
with EPA’s interpretation. 
2. Persuasive factors 
The first three persuasive factors weigh in favor of the Guidance’s 
interpretive nature.  However, these factors are likely not significantly 
persuasive to overcome the dispositive fourth factor––whether the rule 
created a new legal duty or standard.  Moreover, the fourth factor 
demonstrates the Guidance’s invalidity.  Furthermore, CERCLA’s 
retroactive liability strongly supports the Guidance’s invalidity. 
EPA explicitly makes clear that the Guidance is only an interpretive 
rule––satisfying the first persuasive factor.274  The Guidance further states 
that it only applies to agency staff.275  Most significantly, however, the 
Guidance interprets the Brownfields Amendment by examining its 
legislative history, case law, and text.276  This interpretation resembles the 
interpretation in Metropolitan School District v. Davila.277  There, the court 
stated that an agency’s use of the classic interpretive tools supports the 
agency’s assertion that the rule is interpretive.278  However, specifying that 
the rule is interpretive, only meant for agency staff, and includes classic 
interpretive tools has not precluded courts from vacating interpretive 
rules.279  In Hoctor, the interpretive rule contained the abovementioned 
 
273. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(B)(iv) (I)–(III). 
274. See COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8, at 14 (“This memorandum is 
intended solely for the guidance of employees of EPA . . . .  [I]t creates no substantive rights 
for any persons.  It . . . does not impose legal obligations.”). 
275. Id. 
276. See generally COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8. 
277. See generally Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1992). 
278. Id. at 494. 
279. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 172 (7th Cir. 1996); United States 
v. Picciotto, 875 F.2d 345, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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interpretive analysis, and was meant for staff only.280  Yet, the court was 
not persuaded.281  This is likely because of the first factor’s minimal 
persuasive strength.  Several courts have watered down the deference 
applied to an agency’s characterization of its rule.282  Furthermore, the 
Guidance’s interpretations are written with mandatory words such as 
“shall” and “must,” as opposed to “may” and “should.”283  These mandatory 
words characterize the interpretation as binding.  Thus, while the first factor 
weighs slightly in favor of EPA, it likely does not outweigh the fourth 
dispositive factor. 
Similarly, the second persuasive factor––whether the agency 
published the rule in the CFR––has relatively little persuasive force at this 
point.  The Federal Register Act generally states that agencies are required 
to publish any statement with “general applicability and legal effect” in the 
CFR.284  Here, the Guidance was not published in the CFR, which suggests 
that it does not have “legal effect.”  However, this element is a dangerous 
loophole for agencies to fall back on when non-legislative rules are 
challenged.  The D.C. Circuit, which created the factor, subsequently 
dismissed it, holding that it is nothing more “more than a snippet of . . . 
agency intent.”285  Thus, while the second persuasive factor weighs slightly 
in favor of EPA, it likely does not defeat the fourth dispositive factor. 
The third persuasive factor––whether the agency previously adopted 
a similar rule after notice and comment––does not hurt either side of the 
argument.  If EPA previously promulgated a legislative interpretive rule 
through notice and comment, EPA could only amend that interpretation 
through notice and comment.286  Thus, the third persuasive factor does not 
sway the argument in either direction. 
The fourth factor––whether the consequences for violating the non-
legislative rule are significant––likely weighs heavily in favor of vacating 
the Guidance.  In Hoctor, the court found persuasive the significant 
financial strain (and apparent redundancy) that erecting an eight-foot-tall 
perimeter fence would place on Hoctor.287  Here, the stakes are far higher.  
 
280. See generally Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 171. 
281. Id. 
282. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 537 (D.C. Cir. 1986); 
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1575 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bazelon, J., 
dissenting); Chamber of Commerce v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 636 F.2d 464, 
470 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
283. See COMMON ELEMENTS GUIDANCE, supra note 8. 
284. 44 U.S.C. § 1510(a) (2012). 
285. Health Ins. Ass’n of America, Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
286.  Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 
F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
287. Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 168 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting a 
replacement fence would cost “thousands of dollars . . . .”). 
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If a developer fails to obtain the BFPP defense because of the overly 
demanding Common Elements Guidance, the developer stands to lose 
millions.288  A court would likely find that this factor weighs against the 
Guidance. 
Altogether, the legally binding effect test’s factors likely weigh in 
favor of finding the Common Elements Guidance to be a procedurally 
deficient legislative rule.  Therefore, a court is likely to vacate the 
Guidance.  Additionally, CERCLA’s retroactivity should weigh heavily in 
a court’s analysis.  New interpretive rules could have far-reaching impacts 
on developers who acted long ago on past agency interpretations.  
 
Conclusion and Moving Forward 
While this Note outlines how the Common Elements Guidance 
appears to be a procedurally deficient legislative rule, a reviewing court 
could decide either way.  The likely outcome is that a court will rule in 
favor of EPA—but not because the facts or laws are in favor of EPA.  To 
the contrary, a challenger would likely have the advantage from the plain 
meaning, legislative history, and purpose standpoints.  However, courts 
simply defer greatly to agencies, especially if a court applies Chevron.  In 
most wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing actions, courts will find in favor of the 
agency, upholding the law and informing the public that they “should obey 
the agency’s interpretation.”289  The biggest hurdle to challengers is the fact 
that EPA included a “reasoned” analysis in its Guidance. 
There are several cases (not wolf-in-sheep’s-clothing actions) where 
the courts have affirmed EPA’s interpretation of appropriate care, 
consistently citing to the Common Elements Guidance.  The most 
prominent case is PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC.290  
There, the Fourth Circuit stated in dicta that not only is appropriate care 
equal to due care, appropriate care may in fact be stricter.291  Conversely, 
in a now overturned case, a Federal District Court in California viewed the 
due care standard as a much higher standard than the appropriate care 
standard.292  That court held that appropriate care was meant to be a more 
 
288. See Aicher, supra note 54, at 559 (estimating in 1993 that the average site 
cleanup cost is roughly “$30 million . . . .”). 
289. McKee, supra note 48, at 377. McKee also points out that many wolf-in 
sheep’s-clothing actions never receive judicial review.  Id. at 777 n.30.  
290. See generally PCS Nitrogen Inc. v. Ashley II of Charleston LLC, 714 F.3d 161 
(4th Cir. 2013). 
291. Id. at 180. 
292. Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Westside Delivery LLC, No. 2:15-
cv-07786-SVW-JPR, 2016 WL 7665414, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2016), rev’d and 
remanded, 888 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2018). 
5 - MITCHELL_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/2019  3:37 PM 
Hastings Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 26, No. 1, Winter 2020 
 
79 
 
flexible standard.293  However, this case was overturned on separate 
grounds.294  Thus, there is currently no case law supporting the appropriate 
care standard’s congressional meaning.  Therefore, if someone were to 
challenge the Guidance on APA grounds, a reviewing court would likely 
depend on the Fourth Circuit’s ruling in PCS Nitrogen.295 
Alternatively, Congress or EPA could step up to the plate. Congress 
could amend CERCLA again to more clearly define the appropriate care 
standard, thus preventing EPA from enforcing it at an arbitrarily heightened 
standard.  Otherwise, EPA could reinterpret appropriate care in line with 
Congress’s intent.  If EPA has further concerns, it can ensure that PRPs 
follow industry standards by mandating the PRP’s environmental 
consultant list recommended remediation techniques in the AAI.  EPA can 
further require PRPs to implement the environmental consultant’s 
recommendations, ensuring PRPs meet the industry standard.  All of this 
should be done through notice and comment rulemaking.  The notice and 
comment process would allow stakeholders to advocate for a rule that 
reflected congress’s true intent––to enable the public the power to 
remediate for the benefit of all. 
The Trump Administration has recognized the need to reformulate 
EPA’s approach to CERCLA.  In 2017, EPA formed the Superfund Task 
Force.296  In its recommendations, the Task Force explicitly recognized that 
“Congress intended” the BFPP defense to be “self-implementing,” but that 
third parties remain concerned about the defense’s effectiveness.297  
Unfortunately, the recommendation did not include a review of the 
appropriate care standard.  However, EPA’s special advisor on Superfund 
issues recently indicated that EPA is continuing to reevaluate Superfund 
guidances.298  At a recent ABA conference on Superfund sites, the special 
advisor asked: “Have we designed things that are really working?”299  
Hopefully, the special advisor is alluding to the appropriate care standard. 
As for the administrative law question, the legally binding effect and 
substantial impact tests both provide a more balanced and equitable 
 
293. Id. 
294. Id. 
295. PCS Nitrogen Inc., 714 F.3d at 161. 
296. On May 22, 2017, former EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt requested that EPA 
create the Superfund Task Force. U.S. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, SUPERFUND TASK FORCE 
RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (July 25, 2017) https://perma.cc/Y423-2CRH. 
297. Id. at 15 (“Congress intended these liability protections to be self-implementing, 
although some third parties still remain concerned about potential liability and the 
availability of the BFPP protection at contaminated properties.”). 
298. Sylvia Carignan, EPA Seeks Lawyers’ Help Implementing Superfund Changes, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/H4T8-UGE5. 
299. Id. 
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approach to judicial review of non-legislative rules than the proposed 
“notice and comment” test.  While the current state of affairs surrounding 
how courts should review non-legislative rules is treacherously murky, 
courts are still able to draw a line between non-legislative and legislative 
rules.  The Common Elements Guidance exemplifies why courts need to 
continue scrutinizing non-legislative rules.  These tests should not be 
thrown out in favor of judicial efficiency, especially considering that 
Barnhart opened the door to Chevron deference for non-legislative rules. 
 
